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This article uses critical approaches to examine the ways in which dissenters have objected to the 
European Union’s current “politics of rescue.” The authors argue that the term “hospitality” has been 
a key term in liberal theorizing about mobility since the Enlightenment, but that various neo-liberal 
“pull” theories, worries about securitization and the militarization of rescue efforts in the Mediter-
ranean have converged in ways that have turned Europe into an “inhospitable” place for foreigners. 
The authors use three short case studies—of maritime captains’ and sailors’ rescue efforts, academic 
critiques of FRONTEX, and vernacular reactions to the iconic Kurdi image—to put on display the 
contradictions that exist when illiberal decisions are made by EU communities that are supposed to 
be democratically governed by hospitality principles. They also argue that the focus on the social 
agency of “traffickers” deflects attention away from the structural and colonial facets of these migra-
tion “crises.” 
 




For centuries, ancient mariners who crossed the Mediterranean were told that their mari-
time duties included the rescue of those who suffered from shipwrecks, and the European 
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common law that developed over the ages underscored the importance of being “hospita-
ble” to those whose lives were threatened by storms and other hazards. By the time of the 
Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant and other continental philosophers were instantiating rights 
of mobility as some of the human rights that should be granted to rational human beings. 
In a host of ways, the Schengen areas that allow some 400 million Europeans to travel 
across symbolic zones without having to show visas can be viewed as a part of this legacy 
of European “hospitality” (Taylor 2015). The term “hospitality” can in turn be linked to 
other key words or phrases in contemporary neo-liberal lexicons—cosmopolitanism, rule 
of law, equality, egalitarianism and so forth—and these rhetorical figurations help to signal 
that many sovereign states have decided to come together and form the European Union.1 
Talk of mobility during colonial and imperial years, and the inherent rights of humans 
to travel free of encumbrance, made sense when it was Europeans who were negotiating 
with each other about Westphalian borders and travel overseas, but what happens to those 
same vaunted principles, such as hospitality, when tens of millions of the denizens from 
other parts of the world flock to Mediterranean shores and demand their own human 
rights? Moreover, what happens when freedom of movement principles are juxtaposed 
with more restrictive ways of conceptualizing securitized necessities? Note, for example, 
how many interdisciplinary European theorists and international relations practitioners 
comment on the “new” twenty-first-century dangers from terrorists that might require us 
to respect “human security rights.” All of this becomes even more complicated when Eu-
ropean observers on other continents disagree about the polysemic and polyvalent mean-
ings of perceived refugee, migrant or Syrian “crises.” 
Although it is notoriously difficult to point to any specific historical event or major ca-
tastrophe that ushered in contemporary worries about rising numbers of asylum seekers 
traveling to Europe, there is little disagreement that many nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs) and official EU documents record the fact that at least 20,000 people have died 
trying to cross the Mediterranean. While many critics of EU asylum policies complain that 
not enough is being done to make Europe a “hospitable” place, anxious Europeans who 
read about being “swamped” by migrants support the massive funding of fences, walls, 
drones, electronic surveillance equipment and other apparatus that could be used by those 
charged with “border management” of the porous “southern” borders of Europe. 
During the last decade, some crews on EU ships in the Mediterranean have been ac-
cused of looking the other way when they came across leaky vessels that are said to be led 
by “traffickers.” As we argue in more detail, by focusing on the social agency of the smug-
glers or traffickers, and by using securitizing and militarizing frameworks to combat this 
problem, European decision-makers can collectively dodge the endemic structural and 
functional problems associated with migration. 
What is even more inhospitable are the allegedly horrendous conditions that exist in 
detention centers that can be found across parts of Europe and places like Morocco, Tur-
key, Libya, and Algeria, funded in part by the signing of bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments. Those Africans and foreign others who flee political repression or leave those 
detention centers have to hide from the omniscient gaze of the European Union’s border 
surveillance system (EUROSUR), a management system that aids those who want to de-
port “rescued” travelers who can be sent back to their “countries of origin.” 
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Even those nations that wish to be hospitable have short-term memories as the move-
ment of asylum seekers into their countries brings populist pressures for the passage of 
more restrictive legislation on foreign mobility within, and across, European borders. Fin-
gers are pointed in all directions by those advocating draconian or illiberal policies as local 
populations in all of the European countries express their worries about the dangers that 
might come when future generations of their own European children might have to com-
pete with the supposed hordes of “irregular” migrants. 
Thousands of potential asylum seekers who traveled across the Mediterranean between 
2011 and 2016 have been met with tear gas, high fences, militarized national border patrols, 
and myriad xenophobic performances. Even in places like Sweden, representatives from 
the Swedish Democratic Party, like Oscar Sjöstedt, have not only called for the prevention 
of immigration into Sweden but “negative immigration” or “repatriation” that would be 
carried out by discouraging state support for immigrant job placement in that country. 
Representatives from the Médecins Sans Frontières have recently argued that, once “again, 
Europe’s main focus is not on how well people are protected, but on how efficiently they 
are kept away” (Médecins Sans Frontières Staff 2016). 
In this article we explore the ways in which dissenting defenders of policies of “hospi-
tality” have been trying to critique what we view as illiberal European governance. By 
building on the work of critical migration scholars we illustrate how status-quo policies of 
securitization and deterrence—that play well in front of populist European audiences—
end up exacerbating the problems associated with these perceived refugee crisis. 
We recognize that defending a position which privileges “hospitality” has to take into 
account realpolitik concerns. Allowing for more mobility and asking for greater protection 
of migrant or refugee rights is not an easy position to defend. Perceptual worries about the 
existential scope of a contemporary migration “crisis” have severely tested the bonds that 
hold the EU together. Anatol Lieven provided an excellent summary of some of the conun-
drums that confronted European decision-makers and nationalistic populations when he 
explained: 
 
Udo di Fabio, a former judge of Germany’s Constitutional Court, warned this 
month that in opening Germany to the enormous new wave of migrants from 
North Africa and the Middle East, Chancellor Angela Merkel and her govern-
ment have “created a historic breach of law,” involving a direct conflict between 
present government policy and the constitutional obligation to defend the coun-
try’s borders, territorial integrity and democracy. Only a few months ago, such 
a statement would have come only from the right wing of German politics. To-
day, it increasingly represents the views of the German—and European—main-
stream. It is difficult to exaggerate the effect on European opinion of the 
combination of the vast increase in migrant numbers, the Islamic State terrorist 
attacks in Paris, and the mass criminality in Cologne and elsewhere. Commenta-
tors have begun to warn about the possible collapse of key features of the Euro-
pean Union. (Lieven 2016, paras 1–2) 
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Those who circulate these types of counterterrorism rhetorics have not hesitated to defend 
inhospitable ways of conceptualizing EU treatment of asylum seekers. 
In order to explore the rhetorical force of some potentially constructive dissenting rhet-
orics in these refugee situations we want to focus readers’ attention on how several differ-
ent communities of social agents have responded to the controversial efforts of those 
involved with Italy’s “Mare Nostrum Operation” (MNO). While defenders of this operation 
claimed that Italian sailors and others working alongside them saved tens of thousands of 
migrants—and in the process showed the world the meaning of the word “hospitality”—
detractors using economic and militaristic frames of discourse analysis lampooned MNO 
as an example of costly, idealistic ways of “pulling” unwanted foreigners into Europe. 
From a rhetorical standpoint it is perfectly understandable why some southern Euro-
pean authorities would decide to name their major rescue operation “Mare Nostrum.” The 
Mediterranean Sea has often been the sentimental subject of continental poetry—one only 
need ponder the lyrics of the Catalan Joan Manuel Serrat, and his album Mediterráneo (Ser-
rat 1971) to understand this continuum of water and land as a place of mystery, beauty, 
and even death. But the Mediterranean Sea was not always referred to by that name. Dur-
ing the Roman Empire it was common to refer to the waters surrounding the Italian pen-
insula as Mare Nostrum—”our sea.” At the end of the nineteenth century the idea of mare 
nostrum would resurface among Italian nationalists who sought to unify the peninsula 
(and its waters) as a nation-state. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, MNO has 
appeared in new imaginations, as a hospitable and merciful campaign to rescue thousands 
of “irregular” immigrants on their way to mainland Europe, regardless of origin. 
One of the key issues we consider is how various cosmopolitan and local communities 
have reacted to the ending of MNO in 2014 and its replacement by what some regard as 
the inhospitable Operation Triton. Did this move by EU decision-makers signal how a lib-
eral Europe was now going to prioritize border management over hospitality, while it 
passed policies that, as critics contend, forced migrants to venture on alternative and more 
dangerous routes, often paying smugglers, generating a black market along the Mediter-
ranean and increasing the risk of injury and death? One’s reactions to MNO often provided 
a litmus test that measured how one thought about the “push” and “pull” facets of refugee 
or migrant crises. 
With this in mind, the rest of this article is divided into four major segments. The first 
three segments highlight the work of different communities of dissenters who have reacted 
to MNO while advocating for more hospitable ways of configuring refugee rights—sailors 
and fishermen defending broad definitions of the “duty to rescue,” academic critics of re-
strictive migration policies and public viewers of the iconic photograph of A(y)lan Kurdi. 
The concluding segment explains how the intersectional work of these three communities 
might aid dissenters who want to see more European hospitality. 
 
Sailors, Fishermen and Mare Nostrum Operation’s Performative Enactment of Hospitality 
 
As noted previously, some of the key groups that have been caught up in the “push-pull” 
realpolitik disputes about the balancing of humanitarian and security concerns are the sail-
ors and commercial fishermen who do not always share the sentiments of the neo-liberal 
H A S I A N ,  M A L D O N A D O  O L I V A S ,  A N D  M U L L E R ,  J A V N O S T —T H E  P U B L I C  2 4 :3  (2 0 1 7 )  
5 
EU authorities who prioritize border management. Between 2013 and 2016 many sailors 
and sea captains who have witnessed the advent of both Italy’s MNO and the EU’s Triton 
mission have become cognizant of the fact that they can be put in jail if EU member states 
do not immunize them from legal prosecution when they choose to rescue migrants, refu-
gees, or asylum seekers. These particular social agents found that they risked a great deal 
when they did not defer to the authority of FRONTEX officials or when they chose to fol-
low old maritime values and expectations instead of listening to elite and popular defend-
ers of the “deterrence” way of viewing foreign travelers. For many Europeans, noted Ben-
Yehoyada (2015, 184), witnessing rescuing dilemmas has turned the “Mediterranean into 
a mirror that reflects their dilemmas about the tensions between the bounds of their polit-
ical union and boundless humanity.” 
It was no coincidence that a decade before the end of MNO, captains and sailors watched 
with horror as Elias Bierdel, Vladimir Dachkevitce, and Stefan Schmidt—the president of 
the German NGO Cap Anamur, and the captain and first officer of the ship bearing the 
same name—found themselves in an Italian court staying trial for allegedly aiding and 
abetting smugglers. The actual trial began in November 2006 in Sicily, but two years earlier 
Dachkevitce and Schmidt had picked up 37 irregular immigrants who were said to have 
been “at the sea’s mercy in a dinghy” (Statewatch 2007, 1). After the captain and first officer 
of the Cap Anamur moved into Italian territorial waters they waited for weeks for permis-
sion to land, and during this period some of the migrants, who worried about the shortages 
of supplies, threatened that they would jump back into the sea. Eventually the crew of the 
Cap Anamur decided that they had to enter the port of Empedocle without obtaining per-
mission from Italian authorities. 
Many of the rescued on the Cap Anamur were Sudanese, and when Dachkevitce and 
Schmidt requested permission to dock they provided a list of the names and the presumed 
nationalities of the rescued migrants. Disputes ensued in Italy as police, customs officials, 
NGO representatives, and carabinieri (Italian police) officers disagreed about whether those 
rescued could apply for asylum or should be treated as “illegal migrants.” 
Under the terms of the Dublin Convention, Malta may have been the technically legal 
place for Cap Anamur to have docked and requested asylum, but all of this was complicated 
by the fact that the captain and first officer invited a film crew on board so that they could 
help video and archive evidence that illustrated the complicated nature of the politics of 
rescue. Part of this tragedy came about when the Cap Anamur sat in a harbor as officials 
from Malta, Italy, and other countries debated about which country should be “rescuing” 
these 37 irregular migrants. 
After five years of heated courtroom wrangling, the sale of the vessel and a loss of mil-
lions of Euros, an Italian appellate court acquitted the head of the German rights NGO, the 
captain, and the first officer. While defenders of the court proceedings averred that this 
was a typical example of humanitarian idealism that did not take into account European 
needs for management of borders, securitization, respect for international treaties, anti-
smuggling efforts, and terrorist threats, defenders of the Cap Anamur—some leftist news-
papers in Germany (Die Tageszeitung)—were reporting that it should be Italy’s refugee pol-
icies, and not these rescuers, who should be put on trial. The German Development Minister, 
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, argued that the appellate reversal of the lower court signaled 
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a “good day” for refugees, and showed that Europeans “cannot just close our eyes to the 
suffering of refugees at Europe’s doors” (Der Spiegel Staff 2009, 1–3). By 2009, Bierdel—
who lost his boat and witnessed a drop in donations to his German NGO—was forced to 
resign as head of this rescue organization. Bierdel told reporters that he had brought re-
porters on board so that he could set an example for those who wanted to critique “Euro-
pean policies that walled off refugees and created a situation in which people seeking a 
better life often drowned” (2009, 5). 
These types of heated rhetorical exchanges about the Cap Anamur affair, between those 
who advocated more open borders and those who were sure that deterrence was the an-
swer, helped with the constitutive crafting of all sorts of contested topoi (topics), narratives 
and other ideological figurations that were circulated in elite and public venues long before 
the 2014 “Syrian crisis.” Although there would be many “hotspots” that would serve as 
the epicenters of much of this discourse, it was some of the media representations of ship-
wrecks off the coast of Lampedusa that forced the hand of the Italian government. The 
Italian government announced the beginning of Operation Mare Nostrum on 18 October 
2013, and this had everything to do with the fact that Pope Francis had called the deaths 
from the shipwrecks “shameful” on 3 October 2013. During 2013 some 3000 migrants lost 
their lives trying to reach Europe, but Angelino Alfano, the Italian Minister of the Interior, 
could report that some 91,000 migrants had safely arrived at Italian ports (Kreis 2014, 3). 
For more than a year, countless maritime experts, supporters of open borders and others 
who wanted to see broad definitions of the “duty to rescue” applauded MNO efforts, but 
the ending of the MNO program complicated the legal, economic, and political positions 
of rescuers. The launching of the European Union’s Triton operation meant that maritime 
captains working on commercial vessels or local boats were now put on notice that military 
vessels, the coastguard, or FRONTEX would be the primary agents responsible for “legal” 
rescue in the Mediterranean after 2014. 
By 2015 NGOs were preparing pamphlets that explained to would-be rescuers the 
promise and perils that came with private rescue missions in Mediterranean waters. The 
danger was that sailors who did not worry about the “politics” of those they rescued were 
now being accused of interfering with the systematic “deterrence” plans of the European 
Union. Carrying out rescues by commercial vessels after the emergence of Triton was a 
risky affair, especially when military vessels or sailors on coastguard vessels could accuse 
commercial vessels of interfering with organized and systematic border management schemes. 
In the antiseptic, clinical reviews of success or failure of FRONTEX efforts, one often 
finds that official migration texts are written by authors who use the language of risk man-
agement to help keep track of the yearly efficacy of both private and public Mediterranean 
rescue missions. In some of these official meta-narratives, sailors who carry out unsanc-
tioned rescues are lumped together with private NGO rescuers and both dissenting groups 
are vilified for helping “pull” too many migrants to European shores. These sailors can be 
characterized as well-intentioned social agents who do not understand the operative logic 
of neo-liberal European regimes that have officials who know more about how to balance 
securitization and humanitarian needs. 
These deterrence rhetorics do not just vilify traffickers who get paid large sums of 
money as they use leaky boats to dodge coastguard crews. Sympathetic merchant crews in 
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the Mediterranean feel the ire of governmental officials who are convinced only universal 
respect for deterrence policies can help ensure foreigners realize that only those who go 
through proper legal channels should try these perilous voyages. As Marcon (2013) ex-
plains in an essay that appeared in Il Manifesto, skippers traveling to Lampedusa or Pan-
telleria who became entangled in rescue efforts have either appeared in Italian courtrooms 
or they have been threatened with legal action when they attempted rescues of “irregular 
migrants.” 
Between October 2013 and October 2014, EU legislation was proposed to reduce the risk 
that Italian captains and their crews would lose their livelihood when they continued to 
indiscriminately pick up “victims” and “survivors” of Mediterranean shipwrecks, but sail-
ors and captains referred back to the tales of Cap Anamur when they explained their reluc-
tance to unilaterally participate in some rescue missions. The Italian fishers’ acts that saved 
lives, contended Ben-Yehoyada (2016, 183), “exemplified Mediterranean hospitality,” but 
this liberal principle had to be promoted by those who faced illiberal ways of conceptual-
izing border closings, funding overseas detention centers, and penalizing anyone who is 
aiding and abetting “traffickers.” 
Many sailors and captains working in the Mediterranean on merchant vessels ap-
plauded the efforts of the Italian navy during MNO, especially after mainstream and alter-
native presses credited MNO with having rescued more than 140,000 people. Italian elites 
talked of how monetary concerns forced the termination of MNO, but others were con-
vinced that there were more nefarious factors that contributed to the abandonment of the 
“Mare Nostrum refugee rescue program” (McNeal 2014). 
By the spring of 2015, EUROSUR authorities and other EU officials began crafting new 
narratives that blended together talk of humanitarianism with securitization, and EU 
decision-makers underscored the point that Triton’s goal of border patrolling was not in-
tended to be a substitute for Italian funding of MNO. Yet those who accused EU officials 
of abandoning the migrants were incredulous, and dissenters complained that FRONTEX 
or EUROSUR officials were really more interested in identifying, detaining, and then de-
porting asylum seekers than they were in carrying out any rescue missions. 
The puzzled sailors and captains who were caught in the maelstrom of politicizing the 
rescues were soon joined by academics who were convinced that Europe needed to become 
more hospitable. 
 
European and International Academic Critiques of the European Union’s Inhospitality 
 
At least since the mid-1990s, interdisciplinary scholars have tried to point out some of the 
contradictions that existed in the European Union’s defense of hospitable mobility within 
EU borders and the inhospitable ways in which some of these same member states have 
treated the foreign “other.” Meyda Yegenoglu (2012, 49), for example, argued that the liberal, 
“procedural multiculturalist” approach to contemporary migrations into Europe is limited 
by the current state of global capitalism. Furthermore, “liberalism has become the regula-
tive principle in many metropolitan countries” (2012, 49), even while non-normative cit-
izens continue to be denied legal rights and rescue—a move considered counter-
hegemonic, even by the most liberal of Europeans. Yegenoglu pointed to Derrida’s reading 
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of Kant’s cosmopolitan thesis on universal hospitality. Derrida argued that hospitality as 
we know it will always be a conditional hospitality until we can undo the concept that 
certain people always already properly belong and certain people do not (2012, para. 16). 
Following Derrida’s deconstruction of universal hospitality, Yegenoglu argued that con-
ditional hospitality is necessarily a racist hospitality: a relationship that asserts the hosts’ 
superiority and sovereignty—always and in all cases (2012, para. 16). 
Another critique that focused on the constitutive crafting of crises and the consequences 
of failed attempts to deter deaths came from the writings of Jean-Marie Colombani (2015). 
Colombani averred that European states agreed about the importance of trying to stop 
deaths at sea, but these same nations struggled to find the most efficient way to bring this 
about (2015, para. 1). In a Spanish-language opinion piece in El País, Colombani argued 
that the deaths of nearly 800 migrants in a very short period of time had forced the Euro-
pean Union to address this matter. According to Colombani, since 2015 the duties of 
FRONTEX have tripled. Moreover, FRONTEX was actively “rescuing” migrants along 
Greece’s shores as part of Operation Poseidon, forcing other actors to step in, and these 
various social actors had different goals and motivations for their patrolling of the Medi-
terranean. Colombani (2015), like other cosmopolitan critics of restrictive EU migrant pol-
icies, noted the involvement of NGOs in rescue operations that work in and around 
“small” island states along the Mediterranean—spaces and places that could house some 
5000 refugees (2015, para. 2). Colombani was bothered by some of the securitized features 
of Operation Triton. More troubling still was the fact that individuals like Federica Mog-
herini could send a petition to the United Nations that asked for the authorization of mili-
tary action against Libyan smugglers, a response that she characterized as exhibiting a 
“healthy awareness” that Europeans needed to do something (2015, para. 2). 
Other academic critiques have come from those interested in postcolonial orientations 
or critical securities studies in their analysis of some of this illiberal inhospitality. Caterina 
Miele (2016) recalled that for the past century the relationship between Italy and Libya can 
be best described as neocolonial. It is not surprising for Miele, and we agree, that Italy 
would be involved in the restructuring of Libya after the removal of Gaddafi, particularly 
as Libya is a country full of natural resources whose geographic location is also of strategic 
importance for Italy. It is no coincidence that in 2011 Italy apologized to Libyans for their 
past colonial transgressions, and in return the Libyans agreed to do their part to help patrol 
Libyan shores to cut down on the numbers of Africans who tried to move through Libya 
on their way to Europe. 
For us, the use of militaries in so-called humanitarian campaigns like Triton or bilateral 
patrolling of “southern” or “central” EU borders is more than an instrumental appropria-
tion of humanitarian creeds. More specifically, we believe that Mogherini’s typical neo-
liberal call for the militarization of migrant issues is at the very limits (if not a perversion) 
of liberal, humanist, and democratic ideals. Deciding where patrol boats will not venture 
and deciding to look the other way in the busy Mediterranean is a choice, not a necessity. 
As several academics have reminded us, the very moment Europe decides who should or 
should not be rescued, who deserves European hospitality and who does not, is also the 
key moment these discursive choices have material impacts. It matters a great deal how 
one decides to preserve the Mediterranean visual landscape as death-free (or corpse-free), 
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and not all academics are willing to accept the draconian deterrence “pull” theories that 
blame rescuers for increasing the number of deaths near Libyan or Italian shores. 
Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani’s (2016) report—which has been used by members 
of Amnesty and the United Nations—provided one of the most detailed (and damning) 
illustrations of the inhospitality that is afforded by present EU border management 
schemes. Shifting their attention away from what others have called a “migration crisis,” 
Heller and Pezzani argued that we are instead witnessing “the crisis of the current EU 
border regime,” a problematic that involves selective and strategic interpretations of the 
“duty to rescue” (2016, 1–2). For Heller and Pezzani, when reluctant EU decision-makers 
working for FRONTEX or other organizations perform selective rescues, they paradoxi-
cally engage in thanatopolitical acts that caused, rather than prevented, countless deaths. 
Heller and Pezzani, using “oceanographic” and “forensic” evidence such as interviews, 
surveillance imagery, and textual analyses, advanced the controversial claim that they 
could put together interactive websites which would allow viewers to “see” how EU ships, 
which were supposed to be helping with rescue missions, were actually leaving persons 
to die in the middle of the Mediterranean. They also noted how the securitization and mil-
itarization of this inhospitable environment created situations where commercial ships be-
came complicit in selective rescue and deportation. EU authorities sometimes destroyed 
some makeshift vessels in their wars against the traffickers. 
In fascinating and insightful ways, Heller and Pezzani explained how the EU member 
states were using a politics of rescue to rhetorically reconstitute the borders of Europe, so 
that they could off-load responsibility as they negotiated with countries like Morocco or 
Libya to take primary responsibility for managing the ebbs and flows of human tides. They 
elaborated by noting that the borders of Europe are reshaped when land “and sea have 
been locked into a continuum by the Europeanization of migration policies” that involved 
acts of non-assistance or strategic rescue (Heller and Pezzani 2016, 3). 
Unlike other scholars who are eulogistic in their characterizations of Italy’s MNO, Hel-
ler and Pezzani were skeptical when they heard that MNO created the hospitable place for 
which so many were looking. From their vantage point, a heavily funded program that 
initially aimed to rescue tens of thousands of migrants at the mercy of the elements ended 
up obscuring “the fact that, while a record number of people were rescued, a record num-
ber of deaths were also recorded” (Heller and Pezzani 2016, 10). As readers might imagine, 
the neo-liberal defenders of EU policies pointed to the numbers saved while liberal critics 
of those same policies underscored the selective nature of FRONTEX rescuing efforts. 
Martina Tazzioli (2016, 2) similarly argued that over the past two years the Mediterra-
nean Sea has been recrafted as a Foucauldian “space of governmentality—a space of inter-
vention.” This recrafting allows for the staging of “humanitarian, real-time politics of visibility 
that does not merely show how mechanisms of rescue and capture operate but rather con-
tributes to the production of a border-stage—the Libya-Sicily sea-space as a space of rescue” 
(2016, 2; original emphases). This governmental space of operation, Tazzioli contended, 
turns into a performative venture where EU nations spend an immense amount of time 
and money in media outlets so that international viewers can see them at work. 
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Vernacular Calls for Hospitality and the Use of Visuals by Journalists 
and Human Rights Activists 
 
For many dissenting observers who try to point out the contradictions that exist in the 
ways in which EU decision-makers talk and write about the protection of asylum-seekers’ 
rights, the visual registers created after the death of a three-year-old Kurdish child Aylan 
(or Alan) Kurdi, had the best chance of raising the consciousness of European voters. The 
afterimages of Kurdi’s passing played a major role in how journalists, NGOs, and special 
reporters for the United Nations conceptualized the alleged shortcomings of EU border 
policies. According to a UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) study 
of European press coverage during the early months of 2015, the increase in coverage of 
the drowning of refugees and migrants who fled for safety against the Mediterranean led 
to a large public “outcry to increase rescue missions” (UNHCR 2015, 1). 
Many of these particular mass-mediated critiques of EU policies began in early Septem-
ber 2015 when a Turkish photographer, Nilufer Demir, saw a dead child, face down, while 
she visited a beach in Bodrum, Turkey. Readers later learned that Aylan, the dead boy, and 
his family had traveled from the Syrian city of Kobane so that they could make their way 
to Europe, and perhaps to Canada. Aylan, a five-year-old brother named Galip, and his 
parents had boarded a boat from Turkey that was on its way to Greece. They had previ-
ously been denied asylum in Canada. Along the way, the boat capsized. Alan’s father 
would become the sole survivor of this particular dash across this body of water. Lifejack-
ets were not available to the victims. When Nilufer Demir was later asked why she decided 
to take this phantasmagoric image, she explained that she took the picture in order to “ex-
press the scream of his silent body” (Griggs 2015, para. 6). 
While defenders of status-quo policies in the European Union tried to appropriate the 
image and argue for more deterrence policies so that fewer Syrians would try to make 
these dangerous treks, others tried to use the evocative feelings that came from viewing 
this necropolitical representation as an entrée point for more radical social, legal, or polit-
ical critique. “Perhaps it was the innocence evoked by the body of a light-skinned child,” 
speculated Nadine El-Enany (2016, 13), “that enabled the temporary, fleeting awakening 
among white Europeans to a refugee movement that long-preceded the media spotlight 
on that photo.” Heather Snell hypothesized that: 
 
as a symbol of all child migrants, Kurdi [was] available for benevolent appropri-
ation—we cannot save Aylan, but we can save children like him by donating to 
the refugee cause. In doing so, we take up the role of rescuer. (2016, 10) 
 
Regardless of why the image of Kurdi’s lifeless body so outraged a global public, there 
can be little question that this viral, perhaps even iconic, photograph galvanized public 
support for Syrian refugees in the European Union—at least for a little while, and at least 
in some places. According to the Guardian, within 24 hours of Kurdi’s image being pub-
lished, thousands of British citizens formed and signed petitions, donated to NGOs, read-
ied truckloads of supplies to Calais, and volunteered to take asylum-seeking refugees into 
their homes. The charity group Calaid reported being overwhelmed by the sheer quantity 
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of incoming aid and volunteers. James Fisher of Calaid lauded the hospitality of the British 
public, saying: “The generosity here has been so massive that we are having to put emer-
gency storage procedures together now. Around three or four cars arrive each day filled 
with aid, the majority from the UK” (Henley et al. 2015, para. 21). British and international 
charities reported a surge in donations, with Save the Children reporting a 70 percent in-
crease in a single day. The Migrant Offshore Aid Station, a group dedicated to rescuing 
migrants off the Mediterranean, received 15 times its normal donations in 24 hours. Nick 
Pascoe of Malmesbury, Wiltshire, attempted to sum up the impact of Kurdi’s image on 
British hospitality: “I’m just fed up with what I see on TV, the negative rhetoric about des-
perate people. Seeing the drowned toddler was a final straw” (Henley et al. 2015, para. 36). 
According to Snell (2016, 6), this Guardian article exemplified the UK citizenry’s revolt 
against its government’s lack of hospitality, drawing on discourses of “hospitality, human-
itarianism, and global citizenship” and national values of “respect, dignity, and kindness” 
to honor Kurdi’s passing. 
De Andrés-del Campo, Nos-Aldas, and García-Matilla (2016) concluded that Kurdi’s 
photograph was a determining factor for EU states taking immediate actions in support of 
refugees. The photograph appeared in a majority of international media outlets, often as a 
front-page image, and the term “Syria” quickly started trending on Google (2016, 31). Sym-
pathetic publics forced state action. Angela Merkel, for instance, vowed that Germany 
would take in 800,000 migrants that year. In Spain, Madrid city hall displayed a large ban-
ner reading “Refugees Welcome” (El País Staff 2015). A nonprofit organization of the same 
name emerged simultaneously in Germany, offering refugees “a sort of philanthropic 
Airbnb” marching host families with refugees in need of shelter. After all, claimed the 
founders of Refugees Welcome, “Why shouldn’t refugees in Germany be able to live in 
shared flats (or other normal housing situations) instead of mass accommodation?” 
(Strochlic 2015, para. 11). Meanwhile, in Iceland, 10,000 residents volunteered to house 
Syrian refugees, which the Daily Beast described as an “outpouring of basic, decent hospi-
tality from this tiny nation” (2015, para. 2). The Vatican also joined the conversation, with 
Pope Francis calling upon men and women of faith to host a family (the Vatican would 
host two families itself). Per Francis, “Before the tragedy of tens of thousands of refugees 
fleeing death in conflict and hunger and are on a journey of hope, the gospel calls us to be 
close to the smallest and to those who have been abandoned” (Farley 2015, para. 4). Reli-
gious journalist Robert Azzi implored EU residents to engage in a “radical” hospitality: 
“Practice hospitality. Radical hospitality. Invite, receive, and minister to strangers. Chal-
lenge the conventional orthodoxy of believing The Other as threatening and unwelcome” 
(Azzi 2015, para. 20). Hospitality, be it “radical” or otherwise, surged in the liberal portions 
of the EU in the immediate aftermath of Aylan Kurdi’s abject photograph. 
Kurdi’s image temporarily shifted the tenor of the discourse surrounding the Syrian 
crisis. Instead of using the word “migrant” to describe the boy, journalists, activists, state 
representatives, and even ordinary citizens searching Google for information on Syria pre-
ferred the descriptor “refugee,” which de Andrés-del Campo, Nos-Aldas, and García-
Matilla (2016, 35) asserted was a “term of salvation.” To mark one as a “refugee” instead 
of an immigrant demands hospitality because the difference between the two concepts 
“assumes a political shift in the treatment and understanding of the problem of displaced 
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people because the idea of refugee implies an active institutional approach to sheltering 
such people” (2016, 35). A similar discursive shift occurred when describing the housing 
of refugees, with a sudden favoring of the word “shelter” instead of “asylum.” This shift 
is significant because, according to de Andrés-del Campo, Nos-Aldas, and García-Matilla 
(2016, 35–36), the latter suggests a right whereas the former defines an attitude of hospital-
ity and a voluntary program of assistance regarding the treatment of “othered” subjects. 
In sum, the visual power of Kurdi’s lifeless body forced many in the European Union to 
confront their own morality (and mortality), leading to a linguistic shift that favored a 
rhetoric of hospitality in the backdrop of such a deadly image of the Syrian refugee crisis. 
However, despite the photograph’s initial rhetorical and moral force, not all observers 
were convinced that Demir’s photographs of Aylan Kurdi would lead to substantive, pro-
gressive changes in EU migration, refugee, or asylum policies. Snell explained the prob-
lematic potential of sentimentalism: 
 
Kurdi’s image may move many to tears, but its repetition signifies an obsession 
with sentimentalized childhood, which in itself detracts from any real analysis 
of politics while providing reassurance that morality continues to thrive despite 
the hegemony of a neoliberalism that shrinks everything down to its value on 
the market. (2016, 14) 
 
Similarly, Tanja Müller (2015), who has written about other iconic images—including the 
photograph stills and videos that became a part of the commentary on Michael Buerk’s 
famous report from Korem, Ethiopia, during a major famine in 1984—is one of the skeptics 
who worried that even Demir’s evocative image of Aylan Kurdi would do little to actually 
alter Europe’s inhospitable practices. While she recognized that some historical or contem-
porary pictures of humanitarian compassion resonated with international populations and 
helped with charitable giving, she was nevertheless convinced that the circulation, and 
rhetorical framings within empowered circles of decision-makers, would not significantly 
alter the treatment of migrants or refugees, especially in the United Kingdom. She ex-
plained the reductionist ways that motivated social agents to take advantage of the poly-
semy of the Demir photograph: 
 
The picture of Aylan, possibly because he was put into focus not as part of a 
wider refugee movement but as a single, dead, innocent soul, has united even 
the formerly hard-core anti-immigration press in the UK—and so even the Sun 
has come down on Aylan’s side. In addition to a headline that demands “Bomb 
ISIS so that Aylan didn’t die in vain” more in line with its usual political stance, 
the Sun has started a campaign in support of foster homes for orphans combined 
with a fundraising effort “to help save kids like Aylan.” Money donated will go, 
rather unsurprisingly, to the Save the Children appeal that not only has in its 
mandate the exclusive focus on children but in traditional fundraising manner 
uses photographs of individual children singled out through their unique story 
of suffering to secure donations. (Müller 2015, 7) 
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An image that could have been used to alter EU laws for aiding those seeking legal entry 
was instead recontextualized to become part of conservative UK commentaries on terrorist 
threats or other domestic and foreign policy topics. 
In some rhetorical framings of the Demir photographs, Aylan’s passing was used to 
provide one more rationale for the break-up of the European Union or the massive funding 
of restrictive border policies. Bush (2016, 17), writing in The New Statesman, argued that 
sooner or later “the crisis that hit the shores of Italy and the streets of Turkey will come to 
the coast of Dover.” Bush wrote several op-eds before the historic British vote to leave the 
European Union, commonly referred to as Brexit. For Bush (2016), the decision to vote 
“leave” had everything to do with the existence of foreign bodies on the shores of Turkey, 
Greece, Italy, France, and Spain. Many months after Aylan Kurdi’s death, Bush warned 
readers that: 
 
the prospect of bodies washing up on English beaches this summer is a real one 
and, regardless of the last days of the referendum campaign that will take place 
against a drumbeat of public fear—some real, some conjured up by the Leave 
campaign—about a migrant crisis on British shores. (2016, 17) 
 
According to Bush, those who were working for Vote Leave, the cross-party campaign that 
orchestrated Brexit, impacted this decision when they strategically focused on immigration 
in the final days before the vote (2016, 17). “Last summer,” explained Bush: 
 
when photographs of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian boy who had drowned and washed 
up on a Turkish beach, appeared on front pages around the world, the reaction 
in Britain was not a conversation about opening borders or of greater compas-
sion but an increase in support for a Brexit vote. (2016, 17) 
 
The Brookings Institute summarized the complexity of the Syria situation: 
 
The EU refugee crisis needs to be seen against the background of the failure of 
the international community to help share the burden with these neighboring 
countries that are hosting the bulk of the Syrian refugees. After all, the interna-
tional refugee system was set up on the shared understanding that refugees are 
an international responsibility, not just the responsibility of the country where 
they happen to arrive. (Kirişci 2015, 6) 
 
In other words, we could agree that Kurdi’s image was provocative, but it might only sym-
bolize the need for more recognition of EU disagreements. 
Amidst the innumerable contestations within and among the EU states regarding who 
should shoulder the burden of hosting Syrian refugees, Aylan Kurdi’s iconic photograph 
appeared as a possible panacea to these border wars. However much Kurdi’s body re-
minded concerned citizens about the importance of hospitality, the image was ultimately 
appropriated by both pro-refugee and anti-refugee forces to explain the significance of the 
boy’s death in vastly different ways and for dramatically different ideological purposes. 




Only time will tell if the vocal critics of EU border “management” policies, armed with 
liberal ways of thinking about mobility, will be able to alter the rhetorical horizons of a 
neoliberal Europe which fears that too much “hospitality” may lead to shrill demands for 
open borders and equal treatment of foreigners. Here we want to make explicit what we 
have been implying throughout this article—that those who want to use inhospitality as a 
deterrent cure for perceived “crisis” are going down the wrong path. Countries like Jordan 
and Turkey—which already provide havens for millions of refugees, migrants, and asylum 
seekers—bear the heaviest burdens in all of this complex of rescue, but many Europeans 
are convinced that their populations are the ones being threatened by migrant flows. Their 
unique neo-liberal mix of humanitarian and securitizing rhetorics focuses on the efforts of 
smugglers, naïve denizens from “the South” or capitalistic opportunists who are said to be 
forcing the hand of EU officials. Only vocal dissenters are willing to admit that economic 
dislocation or episodic wars in places like Syria or Iraq have anything to do with the struc-
tural after-effects of colonization and imperialism. 
Ironically, there once was a time when Europeans asked the colonized in many parts of 
the world to view Europe as a hospitable place, the “motherland” that brought mission 
civilisatrice (civilizing mission). Europeans did not give a second thought to defending their 
rights to move overseas as they settled countless colonies and dispossessed the “other.” 
The postcolonial bonds of language, culture, and economic desire have encouraged many 
in the “South” to migrate to the “North” in search of a better life. 
As long as EU officials refuse to alter their domestic laws for asylum seekers while “out-
sourcing” some of these problems to places like Morocco, Libya, or Turkey, the European 
Union will continue assiduously to avoid coping with the real structural and material 
causes of these perceptual crises that are linked to foreign affairs issues. The more the Eu-
ropean Union and nations like Italy attempt to deter the foreign flows of people—the met-
aphoric “tides”—the more desperate refugees will find ways to circumvent these controls. 
Illegal smuggling and human trafficking became a problem when legal pathways were 
closed. The failure to take into account the vaunted principles of “hospitality” have not 
only put on display the limits of European humanitarianism—they have also rendered 
visible the impoverished nature of illiberal policies that criminalize the efforts of those who 
continue to risk their lives crossing a thanatopolitical Mediterranean. 
 




1. The terms “liberalism” and “neo-liberalism” are polysemic and polyvalent, so here we need to 
explain our particular usage of these terms in EU migration or refugee crises contexts. When we 
use the term “liberalism” we are referring to the old Reformation and Enlightenment principles 
which assumed that moderate and nonviolent societal reforms could take place only when ra-
tional human beings were allowed entry into economic marketplaces as well as the marketplace 
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of ideas. These ideals were once considered to be the progressive ideas that helped liberate vari-
ous European peoples from the autocratic and draconian powers of monarchs and churches. 
“Neo-liberalism” refers to the appropriation, and resurgence of some of those ideals that are now 
associated with various forms of laissez-faire economic liberalism, which influences the ways that 
EU member states grapple with the expenses associated with the rescue of refugees or the aus-
terity measures that are put in place to justify the termination of Italy’s Mare Nostrum Operation. 
Sadly, the older liberal notions of hospitality that helped all sorts of refugees and migrants before 
1990 have morphed into inhospitable neo-liberal ways of controlling foreign mobility across the 
Mediterranean. For an insightful discussion of the contradictory nature of some of the neo-liberal 
appropriations of the more traditional principles that are used to defend various EU migration 
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